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UE to the sheer volume of decisions published during the Survey
period, this Article attempts to limit discussion herein to those cases
that represent a significant development in real property law or that
involve novel theories or fact situations. This Article limits its scope to those
cases involving real property purchase, sale, ownership, and title issues.
Other real property topics appear elsewhere in this Survey. The legislature
adopted no significant legislation during the Survey period.
I. PURCHASE AND SALE
A. Contract Formation
In Thurmond v. WieserI property owners presented a prospective buyer's
realtor with an offer good for one day only to sell a specific property for
$260,000. The realtor relayed the offer to the prospective buyer, who called
a business associate to discuss the offer since the business associate possessed
knowledge of the property. The business associate called the realtor and
instructed her to counteroffer $250,000 to the property owner, apparently
without the direct knowledge or consent of the prospective buyer. Upon
receipt of the $250,000 counteroffer, the property owner, prior to the expira-
tion of the original acceptance period, dismissed the offer and removed the
property from the market. After hearing that the property owner had re-
jected the $250,000 counteroffer and withdrawn the original offer, the pro-
spective buyer caused the realtor to attempt to accept the $260,000 offer
prior to the expiration of the original acceptance period. The property
owner refused to sell, alleging that the counteroffer constituted a rejection
that allowed him to withdraw the original offer. The prospective buyer later
sued the property owners, alleging a contract to purchase the property in
question. The trial court denied specific performance, and the prospective
buyer appealed.
The appellate court affirmed. 2 The court found sufficient evidence to sup-
* A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Case Western Reserve Law School. Member of the
firm of Arter Hadden & Witts in Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to express his appreciation
for the assistance of James A. Moomaw, Esq., an associate with the firm of Arter Hadden &
Witts.
1. 699 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, no writ).
2. Id. at 682.
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port the trial court's findings of fact and held as a matter of law that an
offeree's power of acceptance terminates when he makes a counteroffer. 3 An
exception exists where the offeror expresses a contrary intention or the
counteroffer provides evidence of the offeree's contrary purpose.4 Because
the prospective buyer, acting through an agent who was determined to have
apparent authority, made a counteroffer without informing the property
owner that the original offer was still under advisement, the property owner
was justified in terminating the original offer and taking the property off the
market.'
B. Contract Interpretation
In Carrington v. Hart 6 the prospective buyer and seller heavily negotiated
a land sale contract, resulting in a number of interlineated contract revisions
that the parties initialled. The seller inserted in the last fully executed and
initialled version of the contract a paragraph that conditioned the validity of
the contract upon both parties signing and accepting it within a two-week
feasibility study period. Immediately following the expiration of the feasibil-
ity period, the seller attempted to repudiate the contract, claiming that he
had not received a final contract within the specified time period. The buyer
successfully sued for specific performance. The appellate court, in affirming
the lower court, held that the seller's conditional paragraph provided that
the parties could agree to change the contract during the alloted time period
and did not require termination of the agreement if a final contract failed to
be published during the period.7 The court of appeals held that a provision
in a contract should be strictly construed against the party inserting the
languageA
C. Contract Enforcement
Medallion Homes, Inc. v. Thermar Investments, Inc.9 involved a Houston
bank's acquisition of the Quail Forest residential subdivision. Wooten, a
prospective developer, lacked sufficient financing to develop the subdivision.
At Wooten's behest Thermar Investments contracted to purchase the lots
from the bank. The contract prohibited assignment without the bank's prior
written consent. Thermar and Wooten, in anticipation of the bank's ap-
proval, on the same day contracted to assign an undivided one-half interest
in the contract to Wooten. The bank, however, did not approve and, there-
fore, the assignment was invalid. Six months later, Medallion Homes, Inc.
3. Id.
4. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 (1979) provides this rule for the
court.
5. 699 S.W.2d at 682.
6. 703 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
7. Id. at 817. The court noted that the seller's conditional paragraph could "reasonably
be read to provide for the modification of the contract by agreement of the parties within the
14-day feasibility study period rather than as a nullification of the entire contract." Id.
8. Id.
9. 698 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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contracted to buy twenty-one lots in the subdivision from Thermar at the
rate of five lots every six months. Wooten then recorded his assignment,
which prevented further conveyances from Thermar to Medallion because
the title company considered the assignment as a cloud on the title.
Thermar and the bank terminated their contract, and a third party
purchased the property. The third party then sold additional lots to Medal-
lion at an increased price. Medallion sued Thermar and others for the in-
crease in the price it paid. The court awarded Medallion its basic loss of
profit damages, but both the trial and appellate court refused to grant Me-
dallion any additional damages, 10 including treble damages sought for a vio-
lation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act (DTPA).II
The court of appeals found that Thermar did not breach the implied war-
ranty of title because the bank's ownership was of record. 12 The construc-
tive notice provided by recording constituted a defense to the cause of action
brought by Medallion under the DTPA.13 Moreover, evidence tended to
show that Medallion had actual notice of the bank's ownership. Further,
since the assignment to Wooten was invalid, it did not constitute a proper
cloud on the title. Additionally, evidence showed that at least one other title
company would have issued a title policy without regard to the purported
assignment. 14
In Hubler v. Oshman 15 a buyer exercised an option to purchase three
acres of land, and the parties agreed that the closing would take place within
a reasonable time. In order to close the transaction and deliver good title, it
was necessary to replat the three acres. Compliance with applicable munici-
pal ordinances regarding the replatting created delays. Some two years after
the signing of the original agreement, the seller wrote the buyer a letter that
attempted to terminate unilaterally the option contract. The letter also sug-
gested that the parties could negotiate a new contract should the buyer still
desire to purchase the property. The parties remained in contact, and the
buyer submitted a proposal to satisfy the municipal requirements to the
seller, at which time the buyer was ready, willing, and able to close the sale.
The seller failed to execute the proposal, and suit resulted. The trial court
ordered specific performance of the option agreement.
The appellate court affirmed. 16 The court held that when a buyer has
made every effort to finish a deal, but the seller's unavailability causes the
sale to fail, the buyer may sue and enforce the agreement through the doc-
trine of specific performance even though the buyer may not have tendered
the purchase price. 17 Provided the contract itself is not objectionable, the
buyer must only allege that he is ready, willing, and able to pay the agreed
10. Id. at 404.
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
12. 698 S.W.2d at 402.
13. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
14. 698 S.W.2d at 403.
15. 700 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
16. Id. at 699.




In Stegman v. Chavers 19 a contract for sale of a residence was to terminate
if the buyer could not obtain satisfactory financing within 180 days. The
buyer did not apply for financing and claimed that the seller's refusal to
allow an appraiser on the property in question justified his noncompliance.
The seller subsequently repudiated the contract and claimed, among other
things, that an oral modification rendered the contract unenforceable. Ap-
parently there was a subsequent oral agreement to deposit earnest money
with the title company, rather than with the seller, as provided by the con-
tract. The buyer sued for specific performance and lost on that issue at trial.
In reversing, the court of appeals held that the parties' oral modification of
the earnest money provision constituted a minor change with regards to the
payment of the purchase price.20 Therefore, the court concluded that the
small oral modification did not invalidate the written contract. 21 The court
found further that whether the seller's conduct excused the buyer from com-
plying with the terms of the contract was a material question, and that the
buyer's evidence raised a fact issue on that question, which precluded the
trial court's grant of the seller's motion for judgment.22
In Gordin v. Shuler23 the contract of sale of an apartment complex re-
quired as a condition precedent the written approval of the first lienholder.
Although this approval was eventually obtained, the property owner refused
to close because the lienholder's approval was conditioned on the owner's
agreement to an increased interest rate and continuing liability on the ex-
isting note. The prospective purchaser then sued, seeking specific perform-
ance of the contract of sale, which the trial court granted. In reversing, the
court of appeals stated that the record clearly supported the owner's re-
peated refusal to agree to the modifications, which constituted conditions
precedent. 24 Because the conditions precedent were not performed, the trial
court erred in granting specific performance. 25
D. Breach of Contract of Sale
Pace v. Garcia26 involved the construction of an agreement for the
purchase of five apartment complexes. The agreement provided that the
parties use best efforts and due diligence to obtain consent from the existing
18. Id.
19. 704 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
20. Id. at 796.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 797.
23. 704 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. Id. at 407.
25. Id. The prospective purchaser also failed to disclose to the existing lienholder the
purchaser's intent to create a third lien on the property; the failure to disclose this intent
mislead the lienholder regarding the true nature of the transaction. This failure to disclose
created a further basis for the court's denial of specific performance based on the clean hands
doctrine, which states that a party "seeking specific performance must come into court with
clean hands and must show, inter alia, that the contract is fair .. " Id. at 408.
26. 631 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
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mortgagees for the transfer of the properties and assumption of mortgages.
The court refused to recognize an implied duty of good faith where the
agreement imposed no such requirement on the parties.27 The agreement
also provided that the seller's sole remedy for failure to close was the reten-
tion of the earnest money as liquidated damages. The court cited prior
Texas case law to establish that such a provision in a purchase agreement
transforms the agreement into an option contract rather than a bilateral con-
tract of sale.28
E. Contracts: Post-Sale Disputes
In Andrews v. Koch 29 the co-administrators of an estate applied to the
probate court for a private sale of a tract of land in order to pay debts and
taxes of the estate. An addendum to the contract of sale provided that the
purchaser would have unlimited access to a road at the boundary of the
tract. The probate court incorporated the administrators' deed, without pro-
vision for the roadway easement, into its decree. Upon partition of the re-
mainder of the estate, the recipient of the adjacent tract disputed the
purchasers' rights to enjoy the easement. The probate court issued an order
nunc pro tunc correcting the administrators' deed to convey the easement.
The court of appeals held that any deed change constituted correction of a
judicial error and that an order nunc pro tunc inappropriately corrected the
deed.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed30 and, citing its prior approval of
Truelove v. Truelove,31 held that the probate court's correction of the admin-
istrators' deed to reflect accurately the true decision of the court did not
involve additional judicial reasoning and, therefore, did not amount to im-
permissible nunc pro tunc correction of judicial error.32 The court found
that title would not pass without both the judicial order and confirmation. 33
The court concluded that the probate court's authority to correct the confir-
mation order established its power to order a correction deed.34
F Brokers: Commission Agreements and Licensing
In Carmack v. Beltway Development Co. 35 the court of appeals extended
the part performance exception to the statute of frauds36 and held that a real
estate broker was entitled to enforce a written real estate commission agree-
ment that failed to describe precisely the subject property.37 A property
27. Id. at 1420-21.
28. Id. at 1421.
29. 702 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1986).
30. Id. at 586.
31. 266 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ ref'd).
32. 702 S.W.2d at 586.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 701 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
36. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)-(b) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1987).
37. 701 S.W.2d at 41.
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owner and a broker agreed in writing that the broker would find a tenant for
a Dallas property in exchange for a six percent commission. The agreement
required that one-half of the commission be paid upon execution of the
agreement with the balance due one year later. The listing agreement de-
scribed the property only by street address and recited, incorrectly, that a
legal description was attached. When the owner terminated the lease and
failed to pay the second half of the commission, the broker sued. The owner
appealed a judgment in favor of the broker and argued that the agreement
failed to describe the property sufficiently to comply with the statute of
frauds applicable to real estate commission agreements. 38
The appellate court found that the insufficient description created no un-
certainty about the owner's acceptance of the broker's services or about the
amount of the commission due. 39 The lessee of the property at issue took
possession of the property, paid the rentals, and made valuable improve-
ments. Under these circumstances the use of the statute requiring a written
commission agreement to deny liability for the commission tends to perpetu-
ate fraud, not prevent it.g° The court also held that although mere perform-
ance was insufficient to excuse noncompliance with the statute of frauds,
under the doctrine of part performance a real estate broker could enforce a
written real estate agreement that failed to describe the property notwith-
standing the statute of frauds when four necessary events occur.41
In Steinmetz & Associates, Inc. v. Crow42 Crow, a real estate broker, en-
tered into a written agreement to purchase property. Steinmetz was a real
estate broker who apparently conducted subsequent negotiations with the
owners for purchase of the same property. The trial court granted judgment
for Crow in a suit for tortious interference with a real estate contract. The
appellate court focused on the knowledge element of the cause of action for
tortious interference, 43 finding that Steinmetz suspected that Crow had al-
ready conducted negotiations with the land owner and had signed a written
contract to purchase the property. 44 Such suspicion fell short of the knowl-
edge required to sustain a cause of action for tortious interference with busi-
ness relationships. 45
Stiles v. DeAngelo46 involved a realtor suing to recover his commission
38. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987). This section
states that "[a]n action may not be brought ... for the recovery of a commission for the sale or
purchase of real estate unless the promise or agreement on which the action is brought, or
some memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged .. " Id.
39. 701 S.W.2d at 41.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 41-42. The events include: "(1) the broker ... fully performed, (2) the other
party... knowingly accepted the broker's services by completing the transaction arranged by
the broker and receiving benefits from that transaction, (3) the other party ... acknowledged
in writing his obligation for a commission, and (4) documentary evidence establishes the
amount of the commission due." Id.
42. 700 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 277-78.
44. Id. at 280.
45. Id.
46. 706 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
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under an earnest money contract. The agreement provided that a six per-
cent commission was due on consummation of the sale or upon the seller's
default. The buyers appeared at the closing and performed their obligations,
but the sellers failed to appear. The buyers then obtained an order of specific
performance, but failed to consummate the sale. The sellers elected to ac-
cept the buyers' $500 deposit as liquidated damages and obtained a summary
judgment in the lower court against the realtor on their claim that they only
owned a commission of $250, pursuant to the contract's provision in the
event of the buyers' default and the sellers' election to receive the earnest
money deposit as liquidated damages therefor.
The appellate court held that when a realtor finds a buyer and the result-
ing contract fails because of the seller's actions, the seller may not defeat the
realtor's action for the commission on grounds that pursuant to the contract
the realtor was not to be paid until the actual sale.47 This clause, which
limits commission payment until time of the actual sale, fails to establish a
condition precedent to liability.48 The seller's obligation to pay the realtor's
commission arose on the day of the original closing when the buyer per-
formed sufficiently to be able to compel specific performance. 49
In Cornerstore Group, Inc. v. Stone 5 o a property owner listed his property
with a real estate broker, which listing contract included a provision that the
seller would not prevent the sale by leasing the property during the term of
the agreement. 51 The broker introduced the property owner to a single pro-
spective buyer. An immediate sale was not completed because of the pro-
spective buyer's lack of resources, but the parties entered into a lease. The
parties consummated a sale after the listing expired. The trial court denied
damages to the broker, and the appellate court affirmed.52
Since the only potential buyer was financially unable to purchase the prop-
erty during the listing period, the appellate court held that the owner's leas-
ing of the property did not prevent the sale.53 The broker's testimony
indicated that the broker had not produced, and could not have produced
during the listing period, a ready, willing, and able buyer, a condition to its
recovering a brokerage commission. The court further refused to find error
with the trial court's holding that the proper measure of damages consti-
tuted the profit the broker would have made, and not liquidated damages in
the amount of commission due under the listing agreement. 54
In Poppe v. Camelot Properties, Inc. 55 the seller signed an exclusive listing
47. Id. at 177.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 710 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
51. The actual language of the listing agreement established that the owner would pay the
realtor a commission "if during the term of this agreement Owner prevents the sale of said
Property by attempting to cancel this agreement, by adversely renting the Property during the
period of this agreement .. " Id. at 818 (court's emphasis removed).
52. Id. at 821.
53. Id. at 820.
54. Id. at 821.
55. 711 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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with a broker to market the seller's house for a specified period of time. The
seller rejected bids from three prospective buyers produced by the broker,
whose bids ranged from twenty to thirty thousand dollars below the listing
price. Two days after the listing contract lapsed, the seller contracted to sell
the house to one of the previous bidders for five thousand dollars less than
the buyer's original bid price. The court, citing Goodwin v. Gunter,5 6 held
that the real estate broker was entitled to a commission even though the
listing had expired before the actual sale took place because the broker had
fulfilled her contractual obligation by producing a ready, willing, and able
buyer during the term of the listing agreement.5 7
In Shehab v. Xanadu, Inc.58 a real estate agent licensed in Michigan
moved to Texas to become sales manager of a condominium project, but did
not secure a Texas real estate license. She received a rent-free apartment and
was "on call" twenty-four hours a day in order to show apartments for sale.
In her suit to recover unpaid commissions the trial court denied the agent
the commissions because she had failed to follow provisions established in
the Real Estate License Act.59 The agent claimed that she fell under the
statutory exemption for on-site managers of apartment complexes. 6° Noting
that the statute attempted to avoid fraud on the public through licensing
dealers in real estate, the court held that the list of exceptions to the licensing
requirements must be strictly construed. 61 Even conceding that the appellant
acted as an on-site manager, the court contended that the legislature did not
intend to broaden its definition of apartment complex to include a condo-
minium operation. 62 Further, the court held that neither the existence of a
contract requiring the payment of commissions nor allegations of fraud
would lift the statutory bar to recovery.63
In Xarin Real Estate, Inc. v. Gamboa64 the owners of a San Antonio
apartment complex contracted, with the aid of an independent, licensed bro-
ker, to sell the complex to Xarin or its nominee. The contract stated falsely
that Xarin was a licensed Texas real estate broker. Xarin subsequently as-
signed the contract to Baker, a condominium converter. At closing Xarin
received a fee for assigning the contract and received a payment from the
seller's broker of one-half of the commission paid to such broker. After clos-
ing Baker sued Xarin under the Texas Real Estate License Act65 on the
grounds that Xarin was not a licensed real estate broker.
The trial court found for Baker and the court of appeals reversed, 66 hold-
56. 109 Tex. 56, 185 S.W. 295 (1916), set aside on other grounds on motion for reh'g, 109
Tex. 56, 63-64, 195 S.W. 848 (1917).
57. 711 S.W.2d at 106.
58. 698 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
59. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §§ 1-20 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
60. Id. § 3(g).
61. 698 S.W.2d at 493.
62. Id. at 494.
63. Id.
64. 715 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
65. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §§ 1-20 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
66. 715 S.W.2d at 87.
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ing that Xarin did not act as a broker under the Texas Real Estate License
Act because it acted for its own account and not for the owner's benefit.67
Citing various provisions of the Act, the court held that the Act necessarily
required a broker to act for another. 6 Under the facts presented, the court
found no evidence that Xarin had acted on behalf of anyone other than
itself.69
G. Deceptive Trade Practices
In Diamond v. Meacham 70 a home warranty agreement between the buyer
and the builder of a townhouse stated that the builder would provide proper
grading for the property. Drainage problems developed in January 1980,
and water first flooded the home in December 1982. The buyer filed suit in
May 1983, alleging that the builder breached its warranty and that such
breach was a violation of the DTPA.7 1 Since the buyer had knowledge of
the drainage problem as early as January 1980, the trial and appellate courts
held that the two-year limitations period of the DTPA barred the resulting
suit.
7 2
In Farrell v. Hunt 73 the purchaser of fifteen acres sued the seller under the
DTPA for wrongful foreclosure under a deed of trust. The purchaser exe-
cuted a note in favor of the seller and assumed liability on a note to a previ-
ous owner. The purchaser sent combined monthly payments for both notes
to the real estate agent, who then sent separate checks to each noteholder.
The findings of fact at the trial court stated that the purchaser was not in
default in his payments at the time that the seller foreclosed on the deed of
trust held by the seller.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the purchaser failed to prove his com-
mon law damages, a prerequisite to recovery under the DTPA, because he
failed to put on evidence as to the amount of the total indebtedness outstand-
ing. 74 Specifically, the purchaser failed to prove the outstanding balance
under the note to the previous owner, which the purchaser assumed and
which was not secured by the deed of trust pursuant to which the seller
foreclosed. 75 The court's decision resulted in a situation where the pur-
chaser lost the property and forfeited all his prior payments, notwithstand-
ing that there was no evidence of a default in such payments.
67. Id. at 84-85. The legislature defines a broker as one who acts "for another person,"
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987), as well as one who is
"employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners," id. § 2(3), in connection with the sale of
real estate.
68. Id. at 84.
69. Id. at 85.
70. 699 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
72. 699 S.W.2d at 953-54 (citing TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp.
1987), which states that suit must be brought "within two years after the consumer discovered
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurence of the false,
misleading, or deceptive act or practice.").
73. 714 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1986).




The court not only failed to credit the purchaser with the sixty-five
monthly payments he had made, but apparently also misapplied the law, a
point raised by Justice Kilgarlin's vigorous dissent.76 The seller's right of
foreclosure existed solely pursuant to the deed of trust, which secured only
the note to the seller. 77 The seller enjoyed no right of foreclosure if the
buyer completely failed to pay the assumed note. 78 Accordingly, Justice
Kilgarlin's analysis did not include proof of the outstanding balance of such
note as a required element of the purchaser's evidence. 79
Justice Kigarlin concluded, as to the issues in this suit, the amount of
indebtedness on the assumed note was irrelevant.80 The proper measure of
damages in a wrongful foreclosure suit is the difference between the value of
the property at issue and the remaining balance on the indebtedness.81 Not
only were the purchaser's payments current, but had the payments made by
the purchaser on the seller's note been correctly credited, the total remaining
debt on the seller's note would have only been $454, as contrasted with the
$23,665 market value of the property on the date of foreclosure. Thus,
merely because the purchaser failed to introduce evidence on the amount of
indebtedness owing on an arguably irrelevant note, which amount was ar-
guably established as a matter of law, the court precluded the purchaser
from recovery, and the seller who wrongfully foreclosed profited by at least
$23,000.
H. Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, and Other Liens
In Sandel v. Burney8 2 a purchaser at a foreclosure sale sued a substitute
trustee and the foreclosing creditor for breach of the warranty of title in a
trustee's deed executed by the substitute trustee after foreclosure of the deed
of trust. Although the trustee's deed contained a general warranty clause,
the United States held a tax lien on the property, which the purchaser neces-
sarily cleared by payment of over $10,000. Since Texas is a lien state, the
court held that the defendants were not liable as a matter of law because
foreclosure of a deed of trust simply transfers title from the mortgagor di-
rectly to the purchaser, and neither the mortgagee nor the trustee ever pos-
sess title to the property.83
In Intertex, Inc. v. Walton 84 a debtor defaulted on a promissory note cov-
ering his residence, which property was then sold at a trustee's sale. In 1980
the debtor was awarded a judgment setting aside the trustee's sale on the
condition that, within six months, the debtor pay the amount due on the
note. The debtor failed to pay the amount due, and pursuant to the judg-
76. Id. at 300-02 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).




81. Id. at 299, 300.
82. 714 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
83. Id. at 41.
84. 698 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ment, a constable seized and sold the property. Written notice to the debtor
of this sale was mailed with an incorrect zip code and by first class mail
instead of certified mail, and the debtor did not receive the notice prior to
the constable's sale. Suit followed to block the debtor's ouster and set aside
the constable's sale. The trial court set aside the sale, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed because the debtor did not receive proper notice of the sale.8 5
The trial court also found that the price paid by the purchaser at the consta-
ble's sale was grossly inadequate. Although the debtor failed to tender the
amount paid by the purchaser at the constable's sale prior to filing suit, the
appellate court held that the debtor's tender within forty-five days thereafter
allowed the debtor to challenge the adequacy of the purchase price.86 The
appellate court also accepted the findings of the trial court that there was
sufficient evidence indicating that the constable acted in good faith and with
the required diligence.8 7
The purchaser in Scalise v. McCallum 8 8 gave the seller a note for approxi-
mately $272,000 as part of a land purchase. The purchaser made payments
of both interest and principal before the due date, but failed to pay the final
interest installment and the majority of the principal. The seller gave the
purchaser notice of a trustee's sale, but before the foreclosure, the parties
reached a settlement agreement whereby the purchaser paid approximately
$215,000 in cash to the seller, along with a new note for $10,000, and as-
sumed the seller's debt for broker's commissions arising out of the sale of the
property. After the seller gave the purchaser an immediate and complete
release of the lien on the property, the purchaser sued for usury, contending
that the original note and the settlement agreement constituted a single
transaction.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's holding that the original note
and the settlement agreement were a single transaction.8 9 Rather, the settle-
ment constituted a substitution of a new agreement concerning the sale of
the property for the old arrangement. 90 The notes made as part of the settle-
ment agreement bore interest within the legal limits applicable; thus, the
seller was not liable for usury.9 1 The court further found that the purchaser
was liable to the seller on the $10,000 settlement agreement note, plus at-
tendant interest and attorney's fees. 92
In Fillion v. David Silvers Co. 93 the failure of a debtor to pay insurance
proceeds over to the noteholder after fire severely damaged the property en-
cumbered by the note precipitated the acceleration of the note. After the
noteholder foreclosed, the debtor challenged the foreclosure sale on the
85. Id. at 712.
86. Id. at 710.
87. Id. at 712.
88. 700 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Id. at 684.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 685.
92. Id.
93. 709 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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grounds of insufficient notice of acceleration. The appellate court noted that
notice of acceleration is unnecessary when the debtor waived such notices.9a
The court further found that the debtor failed to make a valid tender of
the balance owed on the note. 95 A necessary prerequisite to the mortgagor's
recovery of title after a void foreclosure sale demands tender of the amount
due on the note.96 The debtor offered a letter of credit as tender of payment.
The court held that a debtor cannot validly make a legal tender through the
offer of a letter of credit because a letter of credit does not represent an
unconditional offer to pay in cash.97 In the absence of an agreement to the
contrary tender of payment where money is called for becomes invalid when
made other than by cash.98
Prewitt v. United States99 involved an action by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to seize property under an IRS levy to collect civil penalties. A court
had awarded the property at issue, owned by a husband and wife as commu-
nity property under Texas law, to the wife as her separate property when the
couple divorced. The county clerk's office failed to file a copy of the divorce
decree in the deed records of the county clerk until after the IRS had levied
on the property. The husband never executed a deed conveying the property
to the wife. The IRS assessed civil penalties against the husband and filed
notice in the county clerk's office of a federal tax lien against him for the
amount of the penalties, which notice did not name the wife. Ten days after
the notice was filed, the wife sold the property to a third party who possessed
no knowledge of the tax lien against the ex-husband. The IRS then seized
the property under an IRS levy in order to collect the penalties.
The court held that the federal tax lien enjoyed priority over the interven-
ing purchaser from the former wife. 100 The IRS filed the tax lien against the
former husband after the divorce decree became final, but before recordation
of the decree. Under Texas law,101 a former spouse must record in the
county deed records his or her separate interests in real propert created by a
divorce decree in order to protect the interests against the other spouse's
creditors that have no notice of the decree. 102
In Elmore v. McCammon 103 an unsuccessful bidder at a mortgage sale
sued, claiming improprieties in the foreclosure sale and irregularities in the
94. Id. at 245 (citing Cortez v. Brownsville Nat'l Bank, 664 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)).
95. 709 S.W.2d at 246-47.
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 247.
98. Id.
99. 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 1355-56. The court based its decision on this point on United States v. Creamer
Indus., Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965). The Fifth Circuit
noted in that case that the IRS can advantageously use state recording statutes. 349 F.2d at
628.
101. The court, through analysis of prior statutory construction, determined that in cases
concerning divorce the applicable statute is TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.005 (Vernon 1984).
792 F.2d at 1356-58.
102. 792 F.2d at 1356-58.
103. 640 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
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enforcement of tax liens on a tract of real property. The foreclosure sale
occurred pursuant to a deed of trust signed by the record owner of the prop-
erty at the time of the sale. The unsuccessful bidder bid twenty-three dollars
in silver and claimed lawful ownership as a result.
The court determined that Texas case law restricts standing to attack the
foreclosure sale pursuant to a deed of trust to the mortgagor or those whose
property interests or rights are affected by the sale.1l4 In this case the court
found no property interest in the bidder prior to the substitute trustee's
sale. 105 The bidder, therefore, failed to meet the standing requirement.
. Deeds of Trust
In Casbeer v. State Federal Savings & Loan Association 106 a real estate
developer owned a number of Texas properties. In exchange for the note-
holder's agreement not to foreclose on a certain property the developer
agreed to bring the interest current on the note secured by such property
within thirty days, to assign profits from six other properties to the note-
holder, and to execute deeds of trust on two additional properties. The de-
veloper signed the documents regarding most of the assignments and the two
deeds of trust, but only one of the profit assignments was notarized in his
presence. The Fifth Circuit considered "whether a deed of trust has been
perfected when, although it has been recorded and has a genuine signature,
the signer did not properly acknowledge the deed of trust before the notary
public." 10 7 The court held that where the acknowledgment on a certificate is
defective and not apparent from the certificate itself, the fact that the certifi-
cate is recorded serves as constructive notice. 108
J. Statute of Frauds
Carley v. Carley 109 addresses the enforceability of an oral interest in land,
notwithstanding the statute of frauds.' 10 Throughout the parties' marriage,
the parties lived on land owned by the appellant's parents. In 1982 the par-
ties built a six-room house on the land, where they lived until separating
before the divorce action. The appellant's parents told the parties that they
could stay in the house on the land forever. They also told the parties that
the appellant would receive title to the property after their death. No writ-
ten document evidenced these statements.
The appellant contended that the lower court erred in finding that he had
an interest in property owned by his parents and in awarding his former wife
reimbursement in a divorce action for one-half of the couple's community
funds used to increase the value of such property interest. The court of ap-
104. Id. at 908.
105. Id.
106. 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 1440 (footnote omitted).
108. Id.
109. 705 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd).
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)-(b) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1987).
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peals affirmed the trial court's findings that the appellant enjoyed a separate
real property interest in the land owned by his parents,1 1 that the parties
had expended community funds to enhance the value of appellant's separate
estate,1 12 and that the appellee was entitled to reimbursement of one-half of
the community funds so expended.1 13
The court based its decision on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in
Hooks v. Bridgewater.'1 4 In Hooks the court held that an oral interest in
land is enforceable, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, where: (1) the
transferee had paid consideration; (2) the transferee had taken possession;
and (3) the transferee had permanently improved the value of the land with
the consent of the transferor.' 1 5 In applying the Hooks test the court found
that the record established that the consideration for the life estate consti-
tuted the appellant's promise to his parents that he would provide for their
care.11 6 The court found that the record also established the second require-
ment of Hooks, possession by the transferee. 1 7 Finally, the court found that
evidence of the third requirement, that the transferee must have made per-
manent and valuable improvements upon the land with the consent of the
transferor, naturally resulted from the six-room home built by the parties. 118
II. TITLE AND OWNERSHIP
A. Title Disputes and Trespass to Try Title
In Fuentes v. Garcia '1 9 the type of use that a person must show in an
adverse possession action was at issue. Fuentes acquired title to a series of
properties by paying cash to the owners of record in a series of transactions
over a period from 1979 to 1982. He then brought a forcible detainer and
eviction action. The Garcia family possessed the land. Various members of
the family had resided on the disputed lots for a number of years. The
Garcias filed a trespass to try title action. At the trial of the latter action the
evidence demonstrated that all of the Garcias possessed the land since at
least 1963. Fuentes contested this action with the claim that the Garcias had
not established one of the requisite elements of adverse possession, notably
cultivation, use, or enjoyment of the land. 120 The court held that sufficient
evidence of this element existed in the case of each contested lot.121 The
court noted that the standard of use in this type of case merely requires use
111. 705 S.W.2d at 373.
112. Id. at 373-74.
113. Id. at 374.
114. 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
115. Id. at 126-27, 229 S.W. at 1116.
116. 705 S.W.2d at 373.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 696 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
120. The court recognized the necessary elements of establishing title by possession as
"(1) possession of the land, (2) cultivation, use or enjoyment of the land, (3) an adverse or
hostile claim, (4) an exclusive dominion over the property and appropriation of it for the pos-
sessor's own use and benefit, and (5) statutory period of ten years has run." Id. at 484.
121. Id. at 485.
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that is possible on the land at issue.1 22 The use of one lot to dispose of
garbage, another to park a car, while a third lot was improved with a hen
house showed sufficient use under this standard.1 23
In Temple Eastex, Inc. v. Busby 124 Busby brought an action in trespass to
try title to grazing land under the ten-year statute of limitation. 1 25 The issue
at trial revolved around whether the granting of a temporary restraining or-
der in prior litigation between these parties had tolled the ten-year period. If
the temporary restraining order had tolled the statute, the facts were undis-
puted that Busby could not establish possession for ten years. 126
The court held that the prior litigation did not toll the statute of limita-
tions because the prior suit was not adverse to the claim of possession of
Busby. 127 In the prior suit Busby had sought to enjoin the defendant from
entering his land and logging it. The court found that this action was consis-
tent with his claims of title and, therefore, there was no tolling effect. 128
Temple Eastex also claimed that Busby had not established exclusive use of
this grazing land. The court held that Busby's erection of fences with the
ability to hold ordinary cattle proved adequate to demonstrate this
requirement. 129
In Wright v. Wallace 130 the trial court granted summary judgment to the
record owner of the property in question, who had sued to evict possessors
asserting title to the land under the ten-year adverse possession statute.1 31
The appellate court affirmed. 132 The court found undisputed evidence that
the appellants possessed the land and enjoyment thereof,' 33 but found that
they had failed to establish domination of the land for the necessary pe-
riod.' 34 The parties submitted affidavits establishing that the possessors had
begun their entry upon the land with the permission of the record owner;
thus the possessors, in order to satisfy the adverse possession elements,
needed to have notified the owner of their hostile possession.' 35 The evi-
dence submitted did not show when the possessors gave the owner this re-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 485-86.
124. 696 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
125. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958) (current version at TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1986)).
126. 696 S.W.2d at 610.
127. Id. at 611.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 611-12.
130. 700 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958) (current version at TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1986)).
132. 700 S.W.2d at 269. The court noted that under the ten-year adverse possession statute
a claimant seeking to show title by adverse possession must "show affirmatively: 1) possession
of the land; 2) cultivation, use, or enjoyment thereof; 3) an adverse or hostile claim; and 4) an
exclusive domination over the property and an appropriation of it for his own use and benefit
for the statutory period." Id. at 270 (quoting Ramirez v. Wood, 577 S.W.2d 278, 287 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ)).
133. Id.




quired notice. Therefore, the court held, the possessors failed to show an
appropriation for the required statutory period. 136
The parties in Brownlee v. Sexton 137 litigated a boundary dispute as a tres-
pass to try title action. Sexton, the plaintiff, did not have to meet the more
difficult proof requirements usually applicable to such an action. 138 In this
action, adjoining lots contained a common boundary, Shannon Creek. Sex-
ton, the owner of one lot, sued Brownlee, the owner of the other lot, claim-
ing that Brownlee wrongfully possessed a portion of her lot. He denied this
averment, claiming that the creek had a shifted course and no longer consti-
tuted the true boundary. The jury rejected this contention and held for Sex-
ton. On appeal Brownlee contended that Sexton had not adequately proved
her title under the requirements of a trespass to try title. The appellate court
reviewed the pleadings and proof and determined that the action had been
tried as a boundary dispute. 139 The court found the usual stringent proof
requirements of a trespass to try title action were, therefore, not
applicable. 140
In Auchterlonie v. McBride 141 one of the adverse claimants assisted in con-
structing a barbed wire fence around two five-acre lots and began leasing the
pasture to third parties for cattle grazing after the death of the co-builder.
The leasing continued until the adverse claimants brought a trespass to try
title suit based upon the fencing and the cattle grazing. The surviving heirs
of the record owners appealed the trial court's judgment awarding title to
and possession of the tracts of land to the adverse claimants.
The court of appeals held that "where land has been designedly enclosed
and used continuously for grazing purposes for the statutory period, such
use is sufficient notice of hostile claim to support a claim of adverse posses-
sion.' 142 The court found that the adverse claimants demonstrated that they
purposefully enclosed the land claimed for grazing cattle, and, therefore, sat-
isfied the element of open and adverse use. 143
The court further ruled that when the possessor recognizes someone else's
title before the statute of limitations runs, the possessor loses the benefit of
the statute. 144 In applying this rule the court found that the fact that the
adverse claimants offered to purchase the lots in 1978 or 1979 did not de-
stroy the limitation title that had previously matured, since the record
showed that the adverse claimant's possession began in 1956 with the fenc-
ing of the land for cattle grazing.145 Therefore, the limitation title matured
136. Id.
137. 703 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. The court distinguished between the evidence necessary in a boundary action, nor-
mally only a recorded deed, and the evidence necessary in a trespass to try title case, normally
the elements of adverse possession. Id. at 799-800.
139. Id. at 799.
140. Id. at 799-800.
141. 705 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
142. Id. at 185.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 186.
145. Id.
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under the ten-year statute prior to the adverse claimant's offer in 1978 or
1979.
In McKee v. Bedell146 the court held that in order for a take-nothing judg-
ment to be valid, the court must possess jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the defendants.' 4 7 In McKee the appellants' claim to the property at
issue rested upon a 1973 judgment decreeing that Browne, their predecessor
in title, successfully gained title to the property through adverse possession.
The court below had found that on the date that Browne filed suit the appel-
lee's predecessor in title was the record owner of the tract at issue.
The court found that in this case the record reflected that the citation by
publication related to the Browne lawsuit included neither the adverse
claimant's predecessor, a corporation, nor its unknown stockholders. 148
Therefore, the court ruled that they were not party defendants in the earlier
suit and that the trial court enjoyed no jurisdiction over them.149 Conse-
quently, the Browne judgment bound neither the adverse claimant's prede-
cessor nor the unknown stockholders. ' 50 Moreover, the court ruled that the
information in the abstract of title on the date that Browne filed suit consti-
tuted constructive notice that the adverse claimant's predecessor was the
record owner. 151 The court concluded that this fact, coupled with its prior
determination that a record owner cannot be called an unknown owner, sup-
ported a take-nothing judgment.' 52
In De Alonzo v. Solis 15 3 the possessors of three adjacent parcels of land
filed a trespass to try title action in order to establish their title under the
ten-year statute of limitations. 154 The evidence showed that the adverse pos-
sessors continuously possessed the land beginning in 1961, and prior to that,
Naricso Solis enjoyed possession from 1917 to his death in 1961. The pos-
sessors were Solis's heirs.
An adjoining land owner challenged the action by a cross claim. He also
claimed title by adverse possession. His challenge alleged that the adverse
possessors, the heirs of Solis, failed to make the requisite showing of continu-
ous use for a ten-year period. The court held that a demonstration that the
land had been cultivated by tenants of the possessor satisfied this require-
ment. 155 The tenants held this land by a lease that acknowledged the ad-
verse possessors as the landlord.
In Holdsworth v. Guthrie Trust 156 the court held that evidence of intermit-
tent use of land by the true owner of land during the ten-year statute of
146. 705 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).






153. 709 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958) (current version at TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1986)).
155. 709 S.W.2d at 693.
156. 712 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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limitations defeats a claim of adverse possession.157 In Holdsworth the true
owner introduced evidence demonstrating that he had intermittently rented
the property at issue and he and his family had used the property for recrea-
tion. The court held that the adverse possession claim failed because the
true owner must be entirely excluded for the statutory period.' 5 8 Any type
of combined possession by the adverse claimant and the true owner defeats
the claim of adverse possession.159
In Mallett v. Wheat 160 the court held that the sporadic use of property for
grazing purposes coupled with its incidental enclosure by adjoining land-
owners' fences failed to establish adverse possession.' 6' Appellant showed
that the property at issue had been used sporadically for grazing, and had
been enclosed by neighbors' fences. This evidence proved insufficient as a
matter of law to establish the requisite element of appropriation in an ad-
verse possession action.162
In Ybarra v. Newton 163 Ybarra brought a trespass to try a title action
under the ten-year statute of limitations. Ybarra, the adverse possessor,
purchased lots 7 and 8 of a Del Rio subdivision. She believed that she was
actually purchasing lots 9 and 10. She took possession of lots 9 and 10 in
1964 at the time of her purchase. She remained in continuous possession by
living in a house on these lots from 1964 up until the time of the action. The
trial court held that Ybarra had failed to establish adequately the location of
the lands she claimed. The court of appeals reversed,' 64 holding that Ybarra
had been in peaceful and adverse possession of lots 9 and 10 for over ten
years and that she had enjoyed the property during this time.' 65
In Matcha v. Mattox166 the court held that an easement established by
custom may secure the public's right to use the section of a beach between
the mean low tide and the natural line of vegetation. 167 The state established
the requisite elements of an easement by custom: "the public use must be
ancient, peaceable, certain, obligatory, exercised without interruption, and
not repugnant with other custom or law."' 68 Testimony of long-time resi-
dents that they had used the beach and had seen others use the beach with-
out objection of the owners for time immemorial proved sufficient to
establish this easement.' 69
The Matcha court also held that this easement did not remain static.' 70
157. Id. at 179.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 709 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. Id. at 771.
162. Id.
163. 714 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
164. Id. at 356.
165. Id. at 355-56.
166. 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
167. Id. at 98-99.
168. Id. at 98 (quoting State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671, 677
(1969), for the custom elements).
169. Id. at 99.
170. Id. at 100.
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The line of vegetation on the beach in question moved inland as a result of
Hurricane Alicia in 1983. The same hurricane destroyed Matcha's house,
which had been in the natural vegetation on the land side of the beach. The
hurricane, however, tore away the vegetation abutting the beach, and the
line of vegetation now ran inland from the ruins of Matcha's house. The
trial court enjoined Matcha's efforts to rebuild his house, holding that the
house now rested on the public's easement. The easement was not static like
most easements; instead, it moved and followed the vegetation line. The
appellate court analogized this trait of the easement to easements on rivers
that shift due to accretion and avulsion.' 71
In Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State 172 the court held that an easement es-
tablished by dedication or prescription may secure the public's right to use a
beach. 173 In Villa Nova Resort the court found that both prescription and
dedication had established an easement for the benefit of the public.174 The
landowner brought a declaratory judgment action to obtain a determination
of his rights to build on a portion of his beach. The state answered but did
not plead an easement as an affirmative defense. The court recognized that
the state's position on the easement amounted to an affirmative defense, but
excused the pleading requirement. 175 It held that the complaint necessarily
anticipated and raised the existence of the defense; this assumption alleviated
the need for further pleading. 176
The court next construed the appropriate section of the Natural Re-
sources Code.177 This statute establishes a prima facie case that the land-
ward boundary of the area subject to a public easement is a line 200 feet
inland from the mean low tide, unless the vegetation line is consistently
closer than 200 feet. 178 The court upheld the use of expert testimony, which
was based on a projection derived from a survey of adjoining property, to
establish where the line of vegetation would have been. 179
The court in Payne v. Edmonson 180 held that representations to a prospec-
tive buyer by the adjacent landowner that a driveway between the two
properties constituted a common driveway for use by both properties suffi-
ciently created an easement by estoppel. 181 The owner of the putatively
dominant estate sued Edmonson, claiming that he enjoyed an implied ease-
ment by necessity and also by estoppel. A jury found for Payne on both
theories, but the trial court granted Edmonson's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
judgment relative to the easement by necessity, holding that Payne's evi-
171. Id. at 99-100.
172. 711 S.W.2d 120 ('rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
173. Id. at 127-28.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 125.
176. Id.
177. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.017 (Vernon 1978).
178. Id.
179. 711 S.W.2d at 126-27.
180. 712 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. Id. at 796-97.
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dence failed to show that the claimed easement was necessary for the use of
the property due to the fact that a less desirable entrance to the property
existed. 182
Payne introduced evidence going to the three elements of an easement by
estoppel: "(1) a representation communicated to, (2) believed by, and (3) re-
lied upon by the promisee."' 8 3 Payne testified that Edmonson, who hap-
pened to be both the broker for the property Payne purchased and the owner
of the allegedly servient estate, told him that the common driveway served
both properties and that the properties owned a mutual parking lot in the
rear. Payne also testified that he relied on this representation when he de-
cided to purchase the property. The court held that the trial court erred
because Payne's evidence proved sufficient to reach the jury.18 4
The court ordered a new trial because the trial court improperly excluded
Edmonson's testimony that concerned Payne's discussion regarding leasing
a part of the parking lot. 185 This discussion took place prior to Payne's
purchase and would have rebutted Payne's testimony about Edmonson's
representation. The trial court erred in excluding this statement as evidence
of a compromise.' 8 6
Gully v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 187 involved an easement deed
that permitted Southwestern Bell to place a communications cable at the
edge of the property owned by Hazel Gully. The terms of the easement deed
entitled Gully to ask Southwestern Bell to remove the line and relocate it
upon ninety days' notice from the owner if four specified conditions were
met. 188 Since Gully intended to develop an office project on the land, she
gave Southwestern Bell written notice on December 2, 1981, that she had
met the easement deed's four conditions and that Southwestern Bell was
required to move its lines within ninety days. In January 1982 Southwestern
Bell informed Gully that the cable would stay in its location on Gully's
property.
Gully sought declaratory relief, and Southwestern Bell cross-claimed for
condemnation in the event that Gully's claim to title proved good. Upon a
finding that the landowner's title was good, Southwestern Bell condemned
the land. The district court awarded Gully the value of the land condemned
plus damages sustained during the period before the phone company moved
to condemn the property.
On appeal Southwestern Bell objected to the amount awarded as the value
of the land at the time of taking. The court stated that Texas law is well
182. Id. at 796.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 797.
185. Id. at 797-98.
186. Id.
187. 774 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1985).
188. The four conditions stated that: (1) the street on which the property was situated
needed to be cut through and extended west; (2) the property needed to be zoned commercial;
(3) Southwestern Bell's easement needed to interfere with the construction of a commercial
building; and (4) Southwestern Bell needed to be able to get permission to move its lines from
the proper authorities. Id. at 1289 n.l.
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settled that "compensation due a landowner for property taken by eminent
domain is measured by the fair market value of the land at the time of the
taking." 189 Also, the date of taking occurs when the condemnor lawfully
receives actual possession or when given constructive possession through a
special commissioner's award. 190 In this case the court held that the date of
taking occurred on the date on which the court effectively granted the tele-
phone company's petition for condemnation, not the date on which the tele-
phone company technically breached the easement agreement for its
communications cable. 19 1 In addition, the court affirmed the award of con-
tract damages that entitled Gully to recover for her reliance upon the tele-
phone company to fulfill its contractual obligations under the easement deed
and remove the cable. 19
2
B. Equitable Claims
In Tuttlebee v. Tuttlebee 193 the court cancelled two warranty deeds that
had transferred ownership of the homestead of the eighty-two-year-old
owner to her brother-in-law. 194 The court found that the brother-in-law
acted as a fiduciary and that he had breached his duty as a fiduciary by
misrepresenting the nature of the transfer. 195 The owner relied on her
brother-in-law for a variety of services after the death of her husband three
years before the transfer. The brother-in-law had performed housework and
chauffeured the owner during this period. He possessed a real estate license,
as did his wife. Her company prepared the market analysis of the property
at issue.
The court held that the brother-in-law breached his fiduciary duty by mis-
representing the nature of the transfer. 196 The owner informed him that she
wished to will her house to him. He recommended that she deed the house
to him reserving a life estate for herself. The brother-in-law suggested that
the deeding of the property to him constituted only a back-up to the will.
He also suggested that a niece of the owner might contest the will, and that
the deed would insure that he would get the house. The court found that the
owner relied on this misrepresentation and that until the time of trial she did
not recognize that she had relinquished ownership by signing the deeds. 197
In Balaban v. Balaban 198 judicial estoppel did not preclude a party from
testifying that he owned the property where he resided, even though he had
at one point executed an affidavit of tenancy. 19 9 The occupant of land
brought a trespass to try title against his siblings. The occupant, Myrko
189. Id. at 1291.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1291-92.
192. Id. at 1292-95.
193. 702 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
194. Id. at 257.
195. Id. at 256-57.
196. Id. at 257.
197. Id.
198. 712 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. Id. at 777-78.
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Balaban, claimed the land was his under a deed showing the owner as M.
Balaban. The siblings claimed the deed referred to their father, Mychajlo
Balaban.
The siblings introduced an affidavit of tenancy executed by Myrko in
favor of the father. They claimed that this affidavit barred Myrko from as-
serting ownership under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In its opinion the
court recited the elements of judicial estoppel and held that the doctrine did
not operate in this case because the siblings failed to show that the affidavit
was executed in connection with a prior judicial proceeding. 2°°
In The Schismatic & Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church in
America v. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc. 20 1 the court held that the United
States Constitution did not prohibit a court from using the deference rule
when adjudicating a property dispute between two factions of a congrega-
tion.202 A portion of a Presbyterian Church congregation chose to sever its
ties with the Presbyterian Church of the United States (PCUS), under whose
auspices it had been constituted. The PCUS filed a declaratory judgment
action, seeking a declaration that the portion of the local congregation re-
maining affiliated with it owned the church property. The trial court held
for PCUS and the appellate court affirmed. 20 3
The court held that under Texas law the true question concerned which
local congregation owned the property. 2°4 Texas law requires the trial court
to defer to the decision of the hierarchical church that constituted the con-
gregation.20 5 Deference to the decision of PCUS does not amount to a certi-
fication by the court of which congregation is the true congregation in
violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment of the Constitu-
tion.206 Instead, the court merely defers to the ruling of the organization that
had originally constituted the congregation. 20 7
The court in Ford v. Long 20 8 held that the imposition of a constructive
trust on the portion of a husband's estate that vested in him upon the mur-
der of his wife was constitutional.209 The trial court imposed a constructive
trust on certain of Ford's assets for the benefit of the sole legatee of Ford's
200. Id. The court noted elements of judicial estoppel as:
(1) that the declaration relied on was made during the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding; (2) that the statement is contrary to an essential fact embraced in the
theory of recovery or defense asserted by the person giving the testimony;
(3) that the statement was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal; (4) that giving
conclusive effect to the declaration will be consistent with public policy; and
(5) that the testimony must be such as relates to a fact upon which a judgment
for the opposing party may be based.
Id.
201. 710 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. Id. at 703-05. The deference rule simply allows a court to defer to the decisions of
ecclesiastical tribunals. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871).
203. 710 S.W.2d at 708.
204. Id. at 706-07.
205. Id. at 705.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 713 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
209. Id. at 799.
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deceased wife. The trial court also imposed a constructive trust on the assets
that had been his wife's and had vested in him upon her death. The appel-
late court found that the imposition of a constructive trust did not result in
an unconstitutional forfeiture of property upon conviction.210 The court
reasoned that the constructive trust acted as an equitable tool to deny Ford
the fruits of a wrongful act.211 As husband and wife the Fords each pos-
sessed a survivorship interest in certain mutual assets. By murdering his
wife, Ford assured himself of the property; but for his act, the wife might
have taken the property. The constructive trust pervasively reinstates the
situation that would have existed but for the killing.
In Clark v. Amoco Production Co.212 the administrators of the estate of
James R. Meadors sued Amoco Production Company and several other oil
companies, claiming a one-eighth interest in minerals taken from certain
property. The administrators' complaint claimed that James Meadors had
received a deed granting him a one-eighth interest in mineral rights in one
hundred sixty acres of Jefferson County in 1911. The deed was recorded in
Jefferson County in 1931. In 1983 the appointed administrators of Meador's
estate brought suit on behalf of the estate. The magistrate who heard the
case made a recommendation for dismissal on the grounds of presumed lost
deed and laches. The district court adopted the magistrate's report in its
entirety and dismissed the administrators' claim.
The court of appeals determined that the presumed lost deed doctrine re-
quires proof of three elements. 213 The court noted that where all of these
elements are present, a presumption results, and the courts presume the pos-
sessor of the property gained title through a grant of deed. 214 The court
then determined that the district court should not have dismissed the com-
plaint since the administrator had not conceded all elements of presumed
lost deed in the pleadings. 215 The court also considered that under Texas
law the doctrine of laches rests on two elements, 216 but becomes inapplicable
to an action that comes within the provisions of a particular statute of limita-
tions.217 The court of appeals ruled that the district court should not have
applied the doctrine of laches before it made a specific determination of
whether a statute of limitations applied to this case. 218
Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez219 involved a suit by a judg-
ment creditor alleging that its lien on specified property had superiority to
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 794 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 970. The elements include: "(1) a long asserted and open claim, adverse to that
of the apparent owner; (2) a nonclaim by the apparent owner; and (3) acquiescence by the
apparent owner in the adverse claim." Id.
214. Id. at 970-71.
215. Id. at 971.
216. Id. The elements consist of. "(1) an unreasonable delay in bringing a claim although
otherwise one has the legal or equitable right to do so, and (2) a good faith change of position
by another, to his detriment, because of this delay." Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 972.
219. 706 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
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any interest of the purchasers. Jesse and Anita Resendez contracted with
Loveta Alford to purchase a lot in the city of Levelland with improvements,
but without the oil, gas, and other minerals under the property. Upon com-
pletion of the payments, the parties agreed that Alford would give the
Resendezes a clear deed. They failed to record the contract. The purchasers
moved into the home on the premises and resided there continuously. They
paid the final installment under the purchase contract to Alford on Novem-
ber 10, 1983. Texas American Bank obtained a judgment against Alford and
her husband in February 1984. The bank filed an abstract of the judgment
in the appropriate county record during that same month. Warranty deeds
from the Alfords to the purchasers were not filed until May 1984. At the
trial court level the judgment creditors argued that upon proper recordation
of an abstract of judgment it becomes a lien upon real property of the de-
fendant located in the county in which the abstract of judgment is filed and
indexed.220 The creditors claimed that since the Alfords and the Resendezes
had recorded neither the conveyance to the Alfords nor the sale contract to
the purchasers at the time the bank filed its abstract of judgment, its lien
became superior to any claim of the purchasers.
In holding for the purchasers the court of appeals determined that until
the purchasers paid the purchase price, they owned only an equitable
right.221 The court recognized the principle that an equitable title acquired
independent of a legal title is not subject to or governed by the registration
statute,222 and the superiority of such a title may be asserted against a judg-
ment lien creditor even though such creditor possessed no notice of the equi-
table title at the time of fixing his lien. 223 The court cited as a rationale for
this principle that the preference for the equitable rights of third persons
against the legal lien is based on the fact that a judgment lienholder is cer-
tainly not an innocent buyer. 224 In addition, the court noted that the pur-
chasers' possession and use of the premises constituted sufficient notice to




In Haskins v. First City National Bank 226 the vendor and her husband
conveyed a one-hundred-acre tract of land to her son, and the deed was duly
recorded. The deed reserved a life estate in favor of the vendor and her
220. The judgment creditors based this argument upon TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001
(Vernon 1984), which is titled "Establishment of Lien." 706 S.W.2d at 345.
221. 706 S.W.2d at 345.
222. The registration statute noted here by the court is TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001
(Vernon 1984). Subsection (a) of that statute states that "[a] conveyance of real property or an
interest in real property ... is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice unless the instrument has been acknowledged or proved and filed
for record as required by law." Id. § 13.001(a).
223. 706 S.W.2d at 346.
224. Id. at 345.
225. Id. at 347.
226. 698 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
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husband measured by the life of the survivor. During this life estate the
survivor was to enjoy full possession and use of the land. A provision of the
deed reserved to the vendor and her husband the right to disapprove any sale
of the land that the son might make during the lifetime of the vendor and
her husband. The son subsequently borrowed money from the bank, with
the loans secured by deeds of trust on the one-hundred-acre parcel. When
the son defaulted, the bank foreclosed on the tract, but did not interfere with
the life estate or homestead rights of the vendor.
The vendor filed suit against the bank, asking that the conveyance to her
son be set aside. The bank contended that the deed's provision regarding
approval of any sale constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation, but
wished the court to give effect to the rest of the deed. The trial court granted
the bank's motion for summary judgment.
The appellate court affirmed.227 Noting that courts do not favor condi-
tions subsequent and that the deed provision in question did not arrange for
a reverter or a reversion upon its violation, the court held that the provision
was a covenant between the vendor and her son, not a condition subse-
quent. 228 The vendor's remedy would be damages for breach of the conve-
nant.229 Any violation of the deed agreement did not diminish the bank's
security interest in the son's fee simple remainder interest. 230
In Schwarz v. State231 a landowner brought a declaratory judgment action
against the State of Texas to have letters of patent construed. The patents
conveyed the land at issue from the state to his predecessor in interest. The
property owner claimed title to coal and lignite fifty feet under his property.
The state claimed title based on a reservation of mineral estate in the patents.
The Texas Supreme Court held the conveyance of property from the state to
a private individual reserving mineral rights must be strictly construed in
favor of the state. 232 Public policy required the court to interpret the phrase
that reserved mineral rights to the state to include all minerals regardless of
whether recovery of the minerals would result in the destruction of the sur-
face estate.233
In Chambers v. Huggins234 Chambers, a grantor, sought to prove that a
deed by which he conveyed surface rights also reserved reversionary inter-
ests to one-half of the mineral estate. In 1955 Chambers acquired title to the
disputed property through a conveyance that expressly reserved a one-half
mineral estate in the property to the original owner. Upon expiration of the
retained mineral interest the mineral interest vested in Chambers pursuant
to the conveyance. When Chambers subsequently conveyed the surface
rights to Huggins in 1973, he did so by a deed that granted Huggins an
227. Id. at 757.
228. Id. at 756.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986).
232. Id. at 189.
233. Id. at 191.
234. 709 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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interest in the land, and a portion of the mineral rights that Chambers re-
ceived in the 1955 conveyance.
On appeal Chambers argued that the reference to the 1955 conveyance,
which reserved a one-half mineral interest, as well as the language in the
deed stating that only half the mineral interests were being conveyed,
demonstrated the intent to convey only half of the mineral estate. The court
of appeals disagreed; it held that a reservation of minerals must be made by
clear language and rejected Chambers's argument that since the grantor did
not expressly convey the reversionary interest to the grantees, the grantor
reserved it by implication. 235 The court applied the following rules of
construction:
(1) where there is no ambiguity, a deed will be enforced as written even
if it does not express the original intention of the parties; (2) the inten-
tion of the parties must be ascertained from the entire instrument, and
not isolated portions thereof; (3) deeds are construed to confer the
greatest estate that their terms will permit; (4) grants are liberally, ex-
ceptions strictly, construed against the grantor; (5) deeds capable of two
constructions are construed to convey to the grantee the largest estate
possible; (6) it is presumed that all promises and agreements were
merged into and fully expressed by the written instrument; and (7) an
unambiguous written document will be enforced as written and cannot
be varied or contradicted by parol testimony unless it is clearly alleged
and proved that its execution was procured by fraud, accident, or
mistake. 236
In summary, the court of appeals held that the grantor's reversionary inter-
est in mineral rights passed along with the surface rights when Chambers
deeded the land without expressly reserving his mineral rights.237
In Thursland v. Hoster 238 one of the parties brought an action to deter-
mine superior title to a townhouse. Both claimants to a property traced
their title back to a common source. Satterwhite, Inc. had previously owned
the property in dispute. The IRS filed a lien on this property, and the appel-
lee acquired title to the property by quitclaim from the IRS following an
auction. The appellant traced his title through an assignee of Satterwhite.
He alleged that Satterwhite had assigned the property by a warranty deed
before the IRS levied its liens. The appellee did not establish as a matter of
law its underlying argument on summary judgment that Satterwhite's as-
signment constituted a sham sale taken to avoid the IRS's action. 239 A con-
clusive presumption arises that a warranty deed conveys all of the assignor's
interest in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake. 240 The argument that
Satterwhite retained beneficial title presented a jury question.241
235. Id. at 222.
236. Id. (emphasis in original).
237. Id.
238. 713 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
239. Id. at 759.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 760.
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D. Construction of Deeds
In Veltman v. Damon 242 a testator's son brought suit to set aside a deed
from the testator's widow to the couple's daughter. The deed transfered an
entire interest in property to the daughter and would have divested the son
of his conditional remainder interest. When the testator died, his will gave a
life estate to his widow of his half of the couple's property with the power to
sell or dispose of that interest. Subsequently, the widow executed a warranty
deed transferring the entire property to the daughter. The deed's granting
clause referred only to the widow's own undivided one-half interest, but the
habendum clause referred to her own interest and the interest owned by the
estate of the testator. In his action the son contended that the two clauses
contradicted each other and that the granting clause should prevail, allowing
the widow to grant only her own one-half interest to the daughter. The trial
court entered judgment in favor of the daughter.
The appellate court affirmed.243 After finding that the applicable four-year
statute of limitations barred the son's cause of action,244 the court looked to
the deed granted by the widow to her daughter to see if the deed effectively
conveyed the property in question. 245 The court found, looking at the lan-
guage of the deed in its entirety, that the widow intended to convey all of the
property to her daughter, subject to her own life estate. 246 By exercising her
power of disposition, the widow defeated the son's conditional remainder
interests. The Texas Supreme Court, however, modified the lower court's
decision on grounds that the appellate court had interpreted the deed incor-
rectly. 247 The court agreed with the son in holding that the granting clause
prevails where an irreconcilable difference exists between it and the haben-
dum clause.248 As a result of its holding, the court reversed and remanded
this particular portion of the lower court's decision. 249
In Altman v. Blake25° the inheritors of a grantee brought an action to
determine their interests in oil, gas, and other minerals on and under certain
property. In 1938 the property owner executed a deed that conveyed an
undivided one-sixteenth interest in the natural resources of the property pro-
vided the grantee did not lease the interest rights.251 In 1939 this same
242. 696 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), modified, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1985)
(higher court held appellate court interpreted deed incorrectly).
243. 696 S.W.2d at 247.
244. Id. at 243-44. The applicable statute of limitations is found in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958) (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.051 (Vernon 1986)).
245. 696 S.W.2d at 244-46.
246. Id. at 245-46.
247. 701 S.W.2d 247, 247-48 (Tex. 1985).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 248.
250. 703 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.-Amarillo), rev'd, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986). For a
discussion of the supreme court's reversal and its effect on mineral rights see infra notes 374-76
and accompanying text.
251. 703 S.W.2d at 420. The deed's exact language conveyed the 1/16 interest "in and to
all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under" the property, provided that the grantee
"does not participate in any rentals or leases." Id.
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grantor conveyed the entire parcel, except for the one-sixteenth interest con-
veyed earlier. The inheritors of the second grantee brought suit, seeking a
determination of their rights and interests in the property. The trial court
held that the grantor had effectively conveyed an undivided one-sixteenth
nonparticipating royalty interest, and the inheritors of the second grantee
appealed.
The appellate court affirmed, 252 noting the rule that the court must ascer-
tain and give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the language
used in the deeds. 253 The rule further presumes that the parties intend every
clause to have effect in evidencing their agreement, and that the intent of the
parties may be ascertained from the four comers of the document.254 The
rule also requires that "all parts of the deed are to be harmonized and given
effect, if possible, and no part is to be rendered meaningless unless there is an
irreconcilable conflict wherein one part of the deed effectively destroys an-
other part . . *"255 In light of these principles, the appellate court deter-
mined that the first deed limited the conveyance by retaining in the grantor
the right to make leases, thereby stripping the estate of its characteristics as a
mineral estate and making it only a royalty interest. 25 6 The court found that
the second deed required that the rights of its grantees thereunder yield and
be subordinate to the prior sale of royalty interests.257 The Texas Supreme
Court later reversed the court's decision based on precedent in mineral
cases. 258 The court, however, approved of the deed construction rules ap-
plied by the appellate court.259
Smith v. Graham 260 addressed whether the language in four deeds con-
veyed working interests in certain oil and gas leases rather than fee mineral
interests. The court of appeals held that the grantor conveyed fee mineral
interests to the grantees. 261 The court based its decision on the key language
in the granting clause.262 The court ruled that under Texas law the specific
language used in the grant from the grantor to the grantee conveys a mineral
interest. 263 The court concluded, therefore, that since all of the deeds at
issue used the term "in, on and under," they constituted grants of mineral
interests.264
252. Id. at 422.
253. Id. at 421.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 422.
257. Id.
258. 712 S.W.2d 117, 118-20 (Tex. 1986). For a discussion of this case see infra notes 374-
76 and accompanying text.
259. 712 S.W.2d at 118.
260. 705 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. Id. at 707.
262. Id. The key language stated "do hereby bargain, sell, assign and deliver unto [grantee]
an interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under the above described tract equal
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E. Eminent Domain
In Ratcliff v. City of Keller265 a property owner sought to enjoin a city
from proceeding with an eminent domain action to acquire a portion of the
property owner's land in order to construct a storm sewer. The trial court
denied the requested injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed.266 The
property owner contended that the city's condemnation was void because
the proposed use was not a public use since the storm sewer would not serve
all city residents. The appellate court held that the fact that all citizens do
not directly enjoy a public improvement does not prevent the improvement
from being a public use.267
In Flores v. Military Highway Water Supply Corp. 268 a water supply and
sewer service company brought an eminent domain action to condemn prop-
erty for the purpose of constructing a new sewage disposal plant. The prop-
erty owners filed a petition for a temporary injunction blocking the
condemnation. The trial court denied their petition.
The court of appeals reversed. 269 Noting that the water supply company
claimed authority for condemnation under either of two statutory provi-
sions, 270 the court held that neither article applied to the instant case. 271
Article 1434(a) concerns the construction of rights-of-way for the laying of
pipelines and cannot authorize construction of a buffer zone around the pro-
posed disposal plant.272 The company sought to acquire the property at issue
in order to create such a buffer zone. Article 1439 pertains to the condemna-
tion of property for sewage disposal in any city or town, and the court held
the statute inapplicable because the property in question was located in an
unincorporated area.273
In Tejas Gas Corp. v. Herrin 274 Tejas Gas commenced condemnation pro-
ceedings against land owned by the Herrins in order to acquire a right of
way and an easement for the construction and operation of a pipeline. The
special commission that had been appointed determined the value of the
land taken and damage to the property owners to be $7,536.32. Subse-
quently, Tejas Gas deposited the amount of the commissioner's award into
the registry of the court, along with other statutorily required sums and
bonds, and obtained an order for possession of the property. Later, the trial
court allowed the landowners to withdraw the money. Before the trial, how-
ever, the landowners redeposited with the court the amount of the commis-
sioner's award with interest and amended their pleadings to challenge
265. 698 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
266. Id. at 263.
267. Id.
268. 714 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
269. Id. at 384.
270. Id. at 383-84. The water supply company relied on TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1434a, § 4 & art. 1439 (Vernon 1980), both of which concern eminent domain authority.
271. 714 S.W.2d at 384.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 716 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1986).
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Tejas's right to condemn the property. The trial court entered adverse judg-
ment against the condemnor.
The court of appeals held that the landowners' withdrawal of money de-
posited in the registry of the court did not waive their right to contest the
actual taking of the land, unless they retained the money. 275 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed even though the landowners redeposited the funds
with interest before the trial.276 The court stated that the absolute rule of
law requires that after an award has been made and deposited in the registry
of the court, and the landowner has withdrawn the award, the landowner
cannot then assert an unlawful taking. 277
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Landry278 the court granted superse-
deas of an injunction entered against a power company in a condemnation
proceeding brought by the power company against a school district. 279 The
power company had filed condemnation proceedings for property owned by
the school district to be used for construction of a transmission line. The
trial court found the condemnation void and granted the school district a
writ of possession and mandatory injunction. The trial court partially super-
seded its order of possession, but allowed the company to operate its trans-
mission line only in emergencies.
The appellate court granted the company's request for a writ of manda-
mus to supersede the injunction pending its appeal, holding that the power
company had the right, as a matter of law, to use the land while its appeal
was pending. 280 The court noted that the Texas Property Code provides
that pending litigation does not keep the condemning party from using the
property at issue. 28 I The court held that the legislature enacted the statute
"to permit entities having the right of eminent domain to possess condemned
property and subject it to public use."' 28 2 The court held that pending litiga-
tion meant until a court of last resort rendered a determination. 283
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Gordon2 84 involved an eminent do-
main proceeding that permitted Southwestern Bell to take possession of two
tracts of land owned by Gordon. Gordon then sought damages for South-
western Bell's temporary possession of the tracts, and the trial court
275. Tejas Gas Corp. v. Herrin, 705 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985), rev'd,
716 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1986).
276. 716 S.W.2d at 46.
277. Id. at 45-46 (citing State v. Jackson, 388 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. 1965)).
278. 709 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) [Editor's Note: Af-
ter this Article went to print, the Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus in
this case sub. nom. Klein Indep. School Dist. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87
(Tex. 1987). The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow the power company to supercede the injunctive portion of the judgment. Id.].
279. Id. at 695.
280. Id.
281. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.021 (Vernon 1984) states that "[a]fter... an award in a
condemnation proceeding... the condemnor may take possession of the condemned property
pending the results of further litigation .... "
282. 709 S.W.2d at 695 (emphasis in original).
283. Id.
284. 705 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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awarded him $8,750 for the impaired marketability of options on the ease-
ment. With regard to the award for impaired marketability of options, the
court determined that the evidence presented in the eminent domain pro-
ceeding did not justify the award. 28 5 The record showed that Gordon's wit-
ness testified that while he knew that a market for the options existed, his
estimate of Gordon's loss for the impaired marketability of options resulted
from experience. In addition, the witness stated that he knew of no options
offered to the owner during Southwestern Bell's occupancy, nor was he
aware of any purchase offers during that period. Based on this evidence, the
court determined that the evidence did not support the trial court's damage
award for impaired marketability of options.286 With regard to Gordon's
request for attorney's fees and costs, the court stated that the express terms
of the statute287 bound it, and the statute clearly covers only voluntary dis-
missals of condemnation proceedings and does not allow attorney's fees fol-
lowing the judicial dismissal of a condemnation proceeding. 288
Devco, Ltd. v. Murray289 was an eminent domain case. The landowners
owned two tracts of land, and the condemnor owned an oil and gas lease
that covered both tracts. The lease provided for gas gathering production
lines from the gas unit that the two tracts formed. The decision by Devco's
predecessor to transport gas from other production in the field caused these
condemnation proceedings. After the first two condemnation proceedings
were filed, it was discovered that the surveyor's metes and bounds descrip-
tion was incorrect. The condemnor filed the second pair of proceedings nine
months later.
The trial court consolidated all four proceedings. A jury rendered judg-
ment awarding the landowners a recovery on all four of the proceedings.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment as to the first two
proceedings based on the erroneous metes and bounds description. 290 The
court also remanded the first proceedings for dismissal after a hearing to
permit the landowners an opportunity to prove their fees incurred in connec-
tion with the earlier condemnation proceedings.291 In addition, the court of
appeals ordered the trial court to credit the condemnor for funds deposited
in the court's registry and to disallow recovery for any expenses related to
the second condemnation proceedings.292
285. Id. at 768.
286. Id.
287. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.019(b) (Vernon 1984). The statute states that "[a] court
that hears a motion to dismiss a condemnation proceeding shall make an allowance to the
property owner for reasonable and necessary fees for attorneys, appraisers, and photographers
and for the other expenses incurred by the property owner to the date of the hearing." Id.
288. 705 S.W.2d at 768-69.
289. 705 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ granted). [Editor's Note: This deci-
sion was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 394 (May 2, 1987).]





F Disposal of Public Land
In Mansfield v. City of Port Lavaca293 a city owned a seventy-five-acre
tract of land that the State of Texas had granted to it for public purposes
only. The city wished to sell this tract and sought legislation removing the
public trust encumbrance; the state legislature passed a measure removing
the encumbrance in 1983. The city advertised the land for sale, and several
private dock companies combined to submit the single bid received. The city
council accepted the bid, subject to voter approval. The voters approved a
proposition that authorized the sale.
Several individuals brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to set
aside the sale. They alleged various statutory and city charter violations, as
well as the unconstitutionality of the state legislature's action in removing
the public trust encumbrance. The trial court granted summary judgement
in favor of the city and the buyers. The appellate court affirmed.294 The
court held inapplicable a state statute 295 prohibiting the sale of state lands to
corporations, because the state did not own the land when it was sold to the
dock companies. 296 The court further found the evidence insufficient to
show that the tract in question was a public park297 and found no evidence
of a conflict of interest or alleged misconduct on the part of a buyer and the
city attorney. 298 Finally, the court held that the challenged provisions of the
state legislature's measure withstood constitutional analysis.299 Even if a
question remained as to the constitutionality of certain provisions, the legis-
lation's severability clause300 allowed the crucial provisions to stand and the
public trust encumbrance to be removed. 30'
G. Dedication to Public Use
In Zak v. Sanchez302 a landowner brought suit to enjoin a neighbor's al-
leged interference in the use of a road over the neighbor's land. The trial
court determined that the strip of land in question constituted a public road-
way and permanently enjoined interference or hindrance to the public's use.
The appellate court affirmed. 303 The court held that the evidence supported
the trial court's finding of the implied dedication of the strip of land in ques-
tion to public use as a roadway. 3°4 The court noted that the necessary ele-
293. 698 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
294. Id. at 435.
295. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 51.052(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
296. 698 S.W.2d at 431.
297. Id. at 432. The importance of this finding becomes evident when one reads TEX.
PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 26.001 (Vernon Supp. 1987). This statute severely restricts the
taking of park and recreational areas. Id.
298. 698 S.W.2d at 432.
299. Id. at 433-34.
300. This clause effectively declared the 1983 legislation superior to the city's charter
where the two conflicted. Id. at 434.
301. Id.
302. 700 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
303. Id. at 263.
304. Id. at 261-62.
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ments for a finding of implied dedication include: "(1) the acts of the
landowner induced the belief that the landowner intended to dedicate the
road to public use; (2) he was competent to do so; (3) the public relied on
these acts and will be served by the dedication, and (4) there was an offer
and acceptance of the dedication." 30 5 Texas case law holds that when the
parties can show no proof to indicate the owner's intent at the time a public
use began on his property, a presumption arises that the owner possessed the
necessary intent.306
H. Zoning
In City of San Marcos v. R. W. McDonald Development Corp.3 0 7 a devel-
oper owned a fifty-acre tract located outside the city boundary, but within its
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developer wanted to subdivide and develop
the property for residential use. He sought and received approval from the
city planning commission to do so. The city then brought suit, seeking a
declaration that because the developer had not complied with its subdivision
statutes, the court should not allow him to proceed with the subdivision.
The city also claimed that the developer obtained approval from the plan-
ning commission by misrepresenting the source of the water supply serving
the property at issue. The trial court denied the city's request for declara-
tory and injunctive relief.
The appellate court reversed. 308 The court found that the trial court erred
in holding that the conduct of city officials estopped the city from insisting
upon compliance with the subdivision ordinances. 30 9 Unauthorized acts of
its officials that conflict with a city ordinance may not estop a municipal-
ity.310 An exception to this rule exists only for circumstances that clearly
require the exception in order to prevent manifest injustice. 31' The court
further found that the developer's misrepresentations regarding the water
supply constituted fraud because those misrepresentations deceived the city
and its officials and caused injury to the public interest since adequate, un-
polluted water was not available to the subdivision. 312
. Damages
In Uvalde County v. Barrier3 13 the testimony of the owner of real property
concerning the dollar amount of temporary damage to his property proved
insufficient, standing alone, to award damages. The appellate court revised a
trial court judgment for the property owner that would have compensated
305. Id. at 261 (quoting Lindner v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1985)).
306. Id. (citing a proposition approved in O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 279, 339
S.W.2d 878, 882 (1960)).
307. 700 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
308. Id. at 678.
309. Id. at 676-77.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 678.
313. 710 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
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him for damage to his property by the county. The court found that the
award was based on insufficient evidence. 314 The property owner's testi-
mony that he had been told that the cost of restoring his property would be
over $19,000 provided an inadequate basis to award damages.315 The court
ruled that what another told him concerning restoration cost constituted in-
admissable hearsay. 316 The court then ruled that the testimony of a prop-
erty owner, relative to the cost of making repairs, cannot be a basis for
damages unless the owner is otherwise qualified. 317
J. Covenants and Restrictions
Hanchett v. East Sunnyside Civil League 31 8 involved the validity and effect
of certain deed restrictions relating to the minimum cost of housing in a
subdivision. East Sunnyside Court was a residential subdivision subject to a
set of restrictive covenants its developer entered into and recorded in 1955.
The covenants contained two relevant provisions, a requirement that an ar-
chitectural control committee approve all plans for a proposed home before
construction, and second, another requirement that the minimum cost of a
residence be $8,500 with the cost amount depending upon the date the cove-
nants were recorded. The deed possessed no provision for amendments. In
1970 plaintiff Hanchett purchased his lot following the adoption of an
amendment in 1964, recorded in 1977, and prior to a subsequent 1977
amendment. The 1964 amendment prohibited moving houses onto a lot,
and the 1977 amendment authorized renewal or extension of the restrictions
by a majority of the lot owners. In 1984 Hanchett purchased a house in a
different area for $2,200 and moved it on to his lot in East Sunnyside Court.
The court of appeals held that the two amendments were invalid since no
provision in the original restrictions authorized amendments. 319 Even if the
deed had authorized the amendments, since no one recorded either the 1964
amendment or the 1977 amendment until 1977, and the plaintiff received no
actual notice of the proposed amendment in 1977, to which he was entitled
as a property owner, neither amendment would apply to his property.320
Additionally, the restriction relating to the architectural control committee
was invalid as to Hanchett since it was known that one member was dead,
another was presumed dead, and the third could not be located, and no
mechanism existed to provide for the appointment of successor members. 32'
The defendant, however, prevailed since the plaintiff admitted that the resi-
dence did not meet the estimated cost requirement in the current market of
approximately $40,000.322




318. 696 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
319. Id. at 615.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 615-16.
322. Id. at 616.
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Giles v. Cardenas323 involved the enforceability of certain restrictive cove-
nants that prohibited the construction of fencing forward of the street build-
ing setback line. The covenants and restrictions were properly recorded
prior to the conveyance to the defendants of their building lot. The defend-
ants then constructed a fence twenty feet in front of the side street building
line.
The court of appeals found that the recording of the covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions gave the defendants proper notice and that the defend-
ants failed to show that enforcement of the covenants would be inequitable
since they presented no evidence that the developer or any other lot owner
intended to waive the rights of enforcing the restrictions. 324 The fence,
which obstructed vision around the corner of intersecting streets, decreased
visibility in an area where children lived and played. The fence, therefore,
presented a material violation, posing a safety hazard to those living and
driving in the area.325
In Meyerland Community Improvement Association v. Temple326 a prop-
erty owners' association brought an action for declaratory judgment against
sixty-two lot owners in a subdivision, seeking to prohibit the lot owners from
selling their property for nonresidential use. The suit required the trial court
to interpret deed restrictions covering the subdivision. Each of the twenty-
one separate sections was plotted and developed and possessed its own set of
deed restrictions. No one recorded a general plan for the entire subdivision.
The trial court entered judgment for the individual lot owners.
The appellate court affirmed.327 The court held that the separate deed re-
strictions for each section within the subdivision, allowing each section to
change its restrictions after twenty-five years, indicated no intent to create a
continuing common plan or scheme.328 The court also held that the evi-
dence was sufficient to find that certain amendments to the covenants al-
lowed a two-thirds vote of lot owners within a section to change the use of
the property from residential single-family at any time. 329 Further, the
court found sufficient evidence to support the finding of a change in condi-
tions that made it no longer possible to gain the benefits for which the re-
strictions originally were intended. 330
In Selected Lands Corp. v. Speich 331 a developer brought a declaratory
judgment action against the owners of lots within a residential subdivision,
seeking a determination that restrictive covenants required the lot owners to
pay fees for the maintenance of the subdivision's common areas. These com-
mon areas included roads, a swimming pool, tennis courts, and a golf course.
323. 697 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
324. Id. at 427-29.
325. Id. at 428-29.
326. 700 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
327. Id. at 268.
328. Id. at 266.
329. Id. at 267.
330. Id. at 268.
331. 702 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The trial court ruled that the developer could not enforce the restrictive cov-
enants against the lot owners. The appellate court reversed. 332 The court
found that the restrictive covenants placed on the lots constituted covenants
running with the land.333 It further found that the restrictive covenants
were properly recorded in several deeds, giving the lot owners constructive
notice of them.334 The court held that a general plan or scheme to the subdi-
vision existed, noting that a general plan may exist even though not every lot
in a subdivision has a restriction.335 Rather, such a general plan may be
established in other ways, including through an express covenant, by impli-
cation from a filed map or other document, or by parol evidence.
336
The court also held that the restrictive covenants and the assignment to
the successor developer of the right to collect the maintenance fees did not
violate the statute of frauds 337 on the grounds of inadequate property de-
scriptions.338 The parties satisfy the statute of frauds when a property "fur-
nishes within itself, or by reference to other identified writings then in
existence, the means or data by which the particular interest in land to be
conveyed can be identified with specific and reasonable certainty. ' ' 339 In this
case, the naming of designated subdivisions, together with references to re-
corded plats, provided the means or data by which the particular property
could be identified with reasonable certainty.34°
Hidden Valley Civic Club v. Brown 341 involved the denial of a temporary
injunction to enjoin property owners from parking their recreational vehicle
at their home in alleged violation of deed restrictions and covenants. In this
case the property owners testified that they bought the vehicle, a camper, in
April 1979 and had parked the camper on their property since that time.
They further testified that a letter dated September 20, 1984, constituted the
first notice of any alleged deed restriction violation. The appellate court
noted that the status quo preserved by a temporary injunction reflects the
status before the argument began. 342 The court ruled that if the trial court
had granted the injunction and ordered the removal of the vehicle from the
appellee's residence, then in essence it would have accomplished what
should be reserved for a trial on the merits. 343 Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the temporary injunction. 344
332. Id. at 201.
333. Id. at 199.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. (citing Lehmann v. Wallace, 510 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
337. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)-(b) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1987).
338. 702 S.W.2d at 200.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 200-01.
341. 702 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
342. Id. at 667. The court quoted the Texas Supreme Court in Transport Co. v. Robertson
Transp., 152 Tex. 551, 558, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (Tex. 1953), in which it defined the status
resulting from a temporary injunction as "the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status
which preceded the pending controversy." Id.
343. 702 S.W.2d at 667.
344. Id. at 668.
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In DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civil Club, Inc.345 a homeowner's group
sought to enjoin DeNina from placing a satellite dish in his yard. A restric-
tive covenant's provision barring certain types of antenna installation al-
lowed the trial court to prohibit installation of a thirteen-foot diameter
satellite dish.346 The appellate court held that the lower court properly is-
sued a temporary injunction to enforce this provision since the dish had to
move forward of the front building line at certain times.347 DeNina, a resi-
dent of the Bammel Forest Subdivision, signed the Agreement for Modifica-
tion of Restrictions. Unrebutted evidence established that he violated the
provision of the agreement dealing with antennas. The court also found that
the antenna violated another provision of the agreement that required archi-
tectural approval of plans for any improvement that departed from the com-
munity standards of appearance. 348 The lower court properly granted the
temporary injunction since the brilliant white, thirteen-foot diameter dish
created a substantial departure from the serene and wooded subdivision. 349
In Hicks v. Loveless 350 the court enforced deed restrictions upon a show-
ing that the buyer possessed actual notice of the restrictions. 351 One of the
deed restrictions prohibited commercial use of property in a residential sub-
division. The appellee alleged the restrictions did not bind him because at
the time his predecessor in interest purchased the property from the devel-
oper, the developer had not yet recorded the deed restrictions. The failure to
record the restrictions before the initial sale between the developer and the
appellee's predecessor in interest meant that the buyer failed to receive con-
structive notice of their existence. 352 The buyer, however, possessed actual
notice because the developer had discussed the details of the restrictions with
the buyer, prior to the sale. The court enforced the restrictions. 353
K. Condominiums
In Pooser v. Lovett Square Townhomes Owners' Association 354 the owners
of two condominium homes sued the association to enjoin the collection of
past-due maintenance assessments. The two owners claimed certain offsets
against the assessments. Specifically, the condominium owners claimed that
the association had failed to maintain their roofs in good condition and re-
pair. The trial court denied the claim and granted the association's counter-
claim for past-due assessments, interest, and attorney's fees.
345. 712 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
346. The provision's key language stated that "[n]o television or radio aerial wires shall be
maintained on any portion of any lot forward of the front building line of any lot in the subdi-
visions." Id. at 198.
347. Id. at 198-99.
348. Id. at 199.
349. Id.
350. 714 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
351. Id. at 33-34.
352. Id. at 33.
353. Id. at 34.
354. 702 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The appellate court affirmed.355 The court found that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's finding that the roof leakage present in the two own-
ers' condominiums resulted from defective design and construction, and not
from inadequate maintenance.3 56 It further held that neither the applicable
condominium declaration nor the Texas Condominium Act 357 made the
duty to pay assessments contingent upon an obligation to repair. 358 The
court found reasonable efforts on the part of the association to solve the
leakage problem. 359 The court found that the Condominium Act, by provid-
ing that a condominium association may govern the administration of build-
ings within a project, does not establish that an association will be
responsible for the reconstruction of common elements such as defective
roofs, absent contrary agreements. 36°
In Covered Bridge Condominium Association v. Chambliss361 the court of
appeals held that a covenant restricting unit occupancy to those sixteen
years or older was constitutional under both the state and federal constitu-
tions.362 In Covered Bridge the condominium association brought an action
for injunctive relief against condominium owners for violation of the afore-
mentioned covenant. The unit owners counterclaimed and sought judgment
declaring the restriction invalid. The unit owners also asked for the removal
of a notice of lien filed against their property.
First, the court found that under Texas law age restriction covenants re-
main constitutional unless they are unreasonable or arbitrarily applied.363
The court concluded that age restrictions represent a reasonable means of
providing housing that meets the different needs of various age groups.364
Second, the court held that the condominium association need not demon-
strate a compelling state interest in this case because a private contract cre-
ated the covenant, and not a governmental ordinance or statute.365
The court next turned to the question of whether the language of the re-
striction met constitutional standards as applied. 366 The court concluded
that the record possessed no evidence that the covenant was applied in a
discriminatory or arbitrary manner.367  Specifically, the condominium
355. Id. at 232.
356. Id. at 229.
357. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon 1984).
358. 702 S.W.2d at 230.
359. Id. at 231-32.
360. Id. at 232.
361. 705 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
362. Id. at 214.
363. Id. at 213 (citing Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d
98, 101 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ)).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. The proper test in determining whether the language of a private age restriction cove-
nant is constitutional is "(1) whether the restriction under the particular circumstances of the
case is reasonable, and (2) whether it is discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive in its applica-
tion." Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (quoting White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d
346, 351 (Fla. 1979)).
367. 705 S.W.2d at 214.
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owner purchased the property as a single adult and at that time agreed to the
deed restrictions. The owner's problems with the covenant arose later after
she married and had a child.
L. Mineral Rights
Holland v. Kiper 368 involved a conflict regarding the ownership of certain
coal and lignite deposits. Plaintiff Holland granted the defendant title to
property subject to a reservation of mineral rights. She asserted that she had
retained such rights and that they included ownership of the coal and lignite.
The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for the defendants.369 The
court followed the case of Reed v. Wylie,370 which held that rights to near
surface lignite are not retained by the grantor pursuant to a reservation of
mineral rights if any reasonable method of production would destroy or de-
plete the surface. 371 Further, if the surface owner establishes ownership of
the mineral at or near the surface, he owns such minerals beneath the land at
whatever depth it may be found.372 In the instant case strip mining opera-
tions had, in fact, destroyed surface land. The court took judicial notice of
the fact that such open or strip mining provides, as a matter of law, a reason-
able system for recovering coal and lignite located within 200 feet of the
surface. 373
In Altman v. Blake 374 an interest in a mineral fee stripped of some of its
attributes did not render it a nonparticipating royalty interest. The Texas
Supreme Court found that a mineral interest conveyed by deed was a min-
eral fee. 375 The court held that the deed created a mineral fee even though it
expressly stripped the interest of two of the five attributes of a severed min-
eral estate. 376
M, Slander of Title
In Ostarly v. Johnson 377 landowners appealed a denial of damages to them
in their successful slander of title action. The trial court granted the land-
owners a partial summary judgment after holding that the defendant had
slandered title to the property in question, and the court quieted title in the
landowners. The trial court refused to award actual or punitive damages.
368. 696 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
369. Id. at 592.
370. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
371. Id. at 747 (a deposit that is within 200 feet of the surface is deemed near surface as a
matter of law).
372. 696 S.W.2d at 591.
373. Id.
374. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986). For a discussion of the appellate court's decision and its
effect on deed construction see supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
375. Id. at 118-20. The court noted that there are five attributes of a severed mineral es-
tate: "(1) the right to develop (the right of ingress and egress), (2) the right to lease (the
executive right), (3) the right to receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals,
(5) the right to receive royalty payments." Id. at 118.
376. Id. at 118-19. The deed stripped the right to lease and the right to receive delay
rentals. Id. at 118.
377. 700 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
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The appellate court affirmed. 378 The court agreed with the trial court's
finding that the judgment removing the cloud on title rendered the land mar-
ketable. 379 It noted that the evidence offered by the landowners established
only that one out of seven title companies in the city would not issue a title
policy on the property.380 The court further stated that unavailability of a
title policy fails to prove that the property is wholly unmarketable and,
therefore, worthless. 381 The court also held that the landowners had failed
to show that they had suffered actual damages, which are calculated by de-
ducting the market value of the land at the time of trial with the cloud on the
title removed from the price that would have been realized had an actual sale
not been thwarted.38 2
378. Id. at 645.
379. Id. at 644.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 644-45.
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